When the Past Is Another Country:
The Impact of Emigration on Memories

Amy D. Corning
University of Michigan

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Correspondence:
corninga@umich.edu
410 North 24th Street
Richmond, VA 23223
Tel. (804) 648-0669
Abstract

Prior theory and research suggest that “critical years” for memory are linked to the transition to adulthood, but with a few exceptions, the impact on memories of other types of life transition has not been studied. If memories benefit from “privileged encoding” during a transition, then other types of life transition – such as emigration from one country to another – might also influence memories, either disrupting patterns of memories established prior to emigration, or producing new memories linked to the period of emigration. In order to examine the effect of emigration on memories, data on memories of public events were gathered from a sample of emigrants from the former Soviet Union now living in the United States. Many studies using different national samples have demonstrated a relationship between memories of events and the “critical years” of adolescence and early adulthood, and this same association is identified among the emigrants for all but one of the events examined. Evidence for the hypothesized effect of emigration on memories is more qualified; neither of the two events considered shows the expected relation clearly, and alternative hypotheses are discussed. The relevance of these findings to immigration research is considered.
Introduction

The history of the Soviet Union is the history of momentous events, from the 1917 October Revolution that ushered in the communist period, through the Stalin years and World War II, to the Gorbachev era of glasnost and perestroika and the sudden collapse of the U.S.S.R. Previous research on collective memories has examined how national cross-section samples of Soviet and former Soviet citizens remember their country’s past, and shows that fundamental relationships of memories to birth cohort and other social influences can be discerned in the former Soviet Union as in other countries (Schuman and Corning 2000, Rieger 1995, Schuman and Rieger 1992).

How are these events perceived by those who emigrated from the former Soviet Union? Do emigrants’ memories suggest that they participated in the same national conversation as other Soviet/former Soviet citizens, and do they still, even after emigrating? Most of these emigrants are Jews, who, unlike most other Soviet minorities, were able to pursue the possibility of emigration. Highly urban and educated, with little connection to ethnic or religious traditions, yet never officially assimilated, Soviet Jews were routinely discriminated against and subjected to mass repressions; if anything, anti-Semitism has increased during the post-Soviet period, particularly at the grass-roots level. Soviet Jews attracted world attention during the 1970’s, when a combination of circumstances led to their emigration by the thousands as refugees from the U.S.S.R., with most resettling in Israel and the United States. The number of emigrants dwindled initially during the 1980’s, then grew again at the end of the decade. By the first half of the 1990’s, over 30,000 Jewish emigrants were arriving in the U.S. each year (HIAS 2004). Between 1970 and 2000, a total of 402,000 refugees from the U.S.S.R. were resettled in the U.S. (NJPS [undated]).

Those who leave one country for another are uniquely situated with respect to public events, experiencing different parts of their past in different national contexts. The early immigration literature regarded memories as an element of the immigrant’s former identity to be transformed through assimilation, or the “process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups” (Park and Burgess 1921). How enduring, in fact, are memories from a different national past? Do the memories of these mostly Jewish emigrants reveal the same patterns with respect to birth cohort
that have been identified among their former Soviet fellow citizens? And how, if at all, does the experience of emigration itself shape memories? This research begins to address such questions using data from a survey, conducted in 2000, of Soviet and former Soviet emigrants now living in the United States.

A “Critical Years” Effect for Memory

Numerous studies have demonstrated a distinct and consistent generational or cohort effect for memories of public and other types of events (e.g., Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Rubin, Rahhal and Poon 1998; Schuman and Scott 1989), in which individuals generally remember best the events that occurred during their late adolescence and early adulthood (roughly ages 12-29, in research by Schuman and Rodgers [2004], but more limited according to Mannheim [1928 {1952}], and Krosnick and Alwin [1989]). The processes that produce this clustering have not been fully elucidated, but two factors appear to contribute to the pattern. First, individuals tend not to remember events that occurred before they were born, since knowledge of such events must be acquired via other sources and does not have the immediacy of direct experience (Schuman and Scott 1989). Second, memories from adolescence and early adulthood appear to benefit from primacy effects (Schuman and Rodgers 2004), as the adolescent or young adult experiences the social and political world. Karl Mannheim, whose work (1928 [1952]) has been used as a point of departure for previous studies of collective memory, argued that events experienced during the adolescent and early adult years represent a “fresh contact” with the wider social world beyond the narrow family circle, and that the young adult’s growing tendency to actively question and reflect upon experience, instead of accepting social reality as natural, reinforces the novelty and significance of these encounters.

This curvilinear “critical years” effect, where the cohorts that experienced an event during their late adolescence or early adulthood (their “critical years”) are more likely than both earlier and later cohorts to remember an event, has been identified in the U.S., the former U.S.S.R., Germany, Britain, Japan, and Israel (Schuman and Scott 1989; Rieger 1995; Schuman, Akiyama and Knauper 1998; Schuman, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Vinokur 2003). Thus, one important question for the present study was whether these findings could be replicated with an
emigrant sample, or whether the dislocation represented by emigration might be so severe that patterns of memories would be affected.

A second goal of the research was to test Mannheim’s further suggestion that emigration, among other types of life transitions, may produce the same type of “fresh contact” that the adolescent or young adult experiences: “when an emigrant changes his home…a quite visible and striking transformation takes place: a change, not merely in the content of experience, but in the individual’s mental and spiritual adjustment to it” (Mannheim 1928 [1952]). If the destabilization and fresh encounters of emigration create a context for primacy, it may be possible to identify an “emigration critical years” effect for memories of public events that occurred around the time of emigration.

Emigrants from the former U.S.S.R. offer a distinct advantage as a population in which to examine these questions. First, for most of them, emigration meant a more or less complete loss of their former lives and identities. Whereas emigrants from some parts of the world are able to sustain former identities through ties and frequent travel to their communities of origin, for others, particularly refugees, the circumstances of emigration make it a potentially much more destabilizing experience (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Rumbaut 1989): it can be a dramatic and permanent rupture whereby they lose their old identities and must reconstruct themselves in a largely unknown world.¹

From the time Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. began in the 1970’s, and continuing through the late 1980’s, those seeking permission to emigrate were typically deprived of their jobs, expelled from schools, and harassed by the authorities, whether or not the exit visa was granted. Because of severe restrictions on information, travel and communication during most of the Soviet period, emigrants had little practical knowledge about the West before arriving there, and they expected never to return to the Soviet Union or to see again the friends and relatives they left behind. For example, in his collection of essays entitled Less than One, the émigré poet Josef Brodsky tells the poignant story of his parents’ repeated applications to be allowed to visit him after his emigration, and of his own futile attempts to return to visit them before they died.

¹ The disorientation and change in the self-concept that result from emigration under such circumstances are captured in much Soviet and East European emigrant writing (for example, Eva Hoffman’s memoirs, Lost in Translation, or Eduard Limonov’s It’s Me, Eddie), as well as in other descriptions of the emigrant experience (see, for example, Rothchild 1985; Dranov 1981).

Those who departed during the 1990’s after the fall of the U.S.S.R. may not have experienced the same political repercussions or lack of knowledge about their destination, but in light of the economic strictures of the post-Soviet era, most could not hope to finance return visits to the former U.S.S.R. in the near future. Thus, they too experienced emigration as a significant rupture.² Emigrants from the former U.S.S.R., then, should represent a fairly extreme example of the transformation of consciousness Mannheim had in mind—in effect, a rebirth. If there are primacy effects that influence memories, they should be visible within this group.

**Data**

Data on memories of emigrants from the former Soviet Union come from a survey conducted with the assistance of the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA), a major resettlement agency for Jewish refugees, which was established in 1949 and since then has assisted thousands of refugees from all over the world. Samples were drawn from two computerized databases maintained by NYANA, one listing emigrants from the U.S.S.R. assisted by NYANA between 1989 and 1999, and the other listing individuals who agreed to act as sponsors for incoming emigrants between 1992 and 1999—most of whom were Soviet emigrants themselves who had arrived some years earlier. A variety of address verification procedures were used to identify approximately 2500 respondents who could reliably be reached by mail, with each database supplying about half the sample. Standard mail survey contact procedures (including a small incentive) were used to maximize response to the questionnaire, which was sent to respondents in both English and Russian, with instructions to choose the language in which they wished to respond; 1,021 questionnaires were returned. The response rate was 39%.³

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² The difficulty of return visits is apparent in the data. Among those who emigrated between 1991-1997, only 1 in 6 had returned to visit the country of origin. Among those who had been in the US longer, the percentages were higher, but the vast majority of the return visits took place after the USSR had collapsed in 1991.
³ There are few published reports of mail surveys carried out among this population. One study reported a cooperation rate of 70% in a small-scale survey conducted in Maryland (n=53), but respondents were recruited by a community member they knew, and received three telephone call reminders from the same person (Birman and Tyler 1994). Authors on another study,
Given the age of the records used and the impossibility of systematically including emigrants who arrived prior to 1989, the sample cannot be said to be representative of any particular subgroup of the former Soviet emigrant population. Nonetheless, the sample compares quite well to the available data on emigrant arrivals from the former Soviet Union to the U.S. in terms of emigration year and country of origin (see Appendix).

The following question was used to elicit respondents’ memories of important public events:

There have been a lot of national and world events and changes over the past 70 years – say, from about 1930 right up until today. Please think of one or two such events or changes that seem to you to have been especially important. There aren’t any right or wrong answers to the question – just whatever national or world events or changes over the past 70 years come to mind as especially important. (italics in original)

Respondents were provided with space to write in two events. The question wording was identical to that used by Schuman and colleagues in previous research, and specifically in 1990 personal interview surveys in Russia and Ukraine. Thus, in the course of the discussion below, I occasionally compare the emigrant results to findings from those earlier, national surveys. The responses were translated (13% of respondents completed the English questionnaire, and 87% the Russian version) and coded into categories corresponding to specific events.

Emigrants’ Memories of Public Events

The major public events mentioned by the Emigrant sample are shown to the left in Table 1; to the right are examples of the responses coded into each event category. Three public events—World War II; Glasnost and Perestroika, or the cultural and economic reform programs initiated by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev; and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. that followed the abortive coup attempt in 1991, were each mentioned by substantial numbers of conducted in Toronto, reported a cooperation rate of 20% (n=90), but in that case, no follow-up appears to have been done (Barankin, Konstantareas, and de Bosset 1989).

In order to evaluate the reliability of the coding, a 10% sample of responses to the public events questions was selected at random (200 responses, drawn from both the first and second events mentioned). These responses were coded by two independent coders, using codes for the 16 events shown in Table 1, plus codes for Other and Don’t Know. Coding agreement was 96% (191 out of 200 responses coded).
By far the largest proportion of emigrants named World War II: over 50 years after the war’s end, two-thirds of the emigrants mentioned it as either the first or second most important event they remembered, testifying to its personal and lasting impact. Moreover, the war was mentioned in first place by nearly 60% of respondents – fully six times as often as the next two most frequently mentioned events, Glasnost and Perestroika, and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. Thus the Emigrants regard World War II as paramount in importance, the significance of other events notwithstanding.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

As the table shows, many other public events were named as well, but by much smaller percentages of respondents. About 7% of respondents mentioned public events that were too few in number to code into individual categories. These mentions included wars (Vietnam, Yugoslavia, the first Gulf war), as well as scientific developments, medical advances, domestic U.S. events (the civil rights movement, Clinton’s presidency), and future, hoped-for events (world peace); they are combined in the “Other public event” category.

Although respondents were asked specifically to name “national or world” events, 14% of the respondents mentioned their personal emigration experiences, so this category has been included in the table as well. Finally, about 7% mentioned some other personal event, as shown in that category.

5 In general, I use capitalization to identify the label for a particular category of events mentioned by respondents (e.g., “Collapse of the U.S.S.R.”), and lower case to refer to the event itself (“collapse of the U.S.S.R.”). Italics indicate transliterated Russian words when not used as event category labels (e.g., glasnost).

6 Elsewhere, I carry out a formal comparison of the public events mentioned by the emigrants to the events mentioned by the national cross-section samples drawn in Ukraine and European Russia in 1990 (Corning 2006). Despite substantial differences between the Emigrant and National surveys in terms of population represented, administration method, and distribution of the samples on ethnic and other demographic characteristics, and despite the fact that the two surveys were separated in time by the decade that saw the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the memories of the two groups are strikingly similar, and the proportions mentioning World War II correspond extremely closely. Such similarities offer confirmation of the validity of the Emigrant data. More broadly, they also provide support for several well-known but somewhat controversial efforts to draw conclusions about inaccessible populations by interviewing emigrants from those populations (see, for example, Millar 1987, Inkeles and Bauer 1960).
The Relationship of Memories to Birth Cohort

The analyses that follow concern the association between memories of events and experiences, and two types of cohort: birth cohort and year of emigration. The six public events that were named by substantial numbers of respondents are examined below: World War II, the Stalin Era, the Death of Stalin, Space Exploration, Glasnost and Perestroika, and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.

Methods

Mentions of the events are used as the dependent variables in logistic regression models, coded “1” for mention of the event as against “0” for no mention. Respondents could name two events, so mentioning one event does not preclude mentioning another, permitting a much stronger test of the hypotheses.

Table 2 shows the frequency distributions for the independent variables used in these analyses. Birth cohort and emigration year are entered into the models as two separate series of categorical predictors. The birth cohort variable groups respondents by year of birth in 10-year increments. The very oldest respondents—born between 1906 and 1919, their lives span the Soviet Union’s entire history—and the very youngest respondents, born 1970-82, are grouped together in slightly broader cohorts, because of small sub-sample sizes. Although birth years extend from 1906 to 1982, nearly half of the respondents were born between 1920 and 1939, and another third were born between 1940 and 1959. (The age range corresponding to each birth cohort in 2000 is shown next to the cohort years; the mean age for the sample is 59). This distribution reflects in part the older age of the emigrant population, but may also be due to the fact that younger, busier, respondents were less likely to complete the mail questionnaire.

The emigration year categories and distribution are also shown in Table 2. As discussed previously, the sampling frame included emigrants who left the former Soviet Union in the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s, but over half of the respondents in the sample in fact left after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991. In light of the small subgroup size for emigration years before 1988, these respondents have been grouped into a single category. Otherwise, emigration years are represented separately.
Three additional variables are included as controls. Education has been shown to exert a significant influence on memories (Schuman and Rodgers 2004, Rieger 1995) and is also correlated with birth cohort. Therefore, a variable showing level of educational attainment is included (as an ordinal variable with five levels, for “incomplete secondary or less” through “advanced degree,” representing respondent’s highest educational attainment, whether acquired in the former U.S.S.R. or the U.S.).

Since many events might have particular significance for Jews over and above their general importance, and because birth cohort and Jewish ethnicity are correlated in the emigrant sample, a variable for Jewish self-identification is also included (coded “1” for Jewish, “0” otherwise). Finally, respondent’s gender is included as a standard control (with women coded “1”, men coded “0”).

Some of the associations between independent variables are fairly strong. Jewish ethnicity is correlated with birth cohort (older emigrants are more likely to be Jewish; $r = -0.33$, $p < .001$), and emigration year is correlated with birth cohort (probably since those who arrived earlier are older; $r = 0.18$, $p < .001$). (Because of this association, emigration year has been included in all regression models as a control.) Since the magnitude of these correlations raises concerns about multicollinearity in the regressions, collinearity diagnostics were examined. The maximum variance inflation factor was 1.22, for birth cohort, and the mean was 1.09. This level of multicollinearity should not preclude using all independent variables in the same regression.

In evaluating the associations between the two types of cohort variables and mentions of the events, I rely in part on figures that use predicted probabilities from the logistic regression equations to represent the relations graphically. However, I also test the “critical years” hypothesis more formally, using a second set of logistic regression models. Following Schuman and Rodgers (2004), I define “critical years” as including ages 12 through 29. For each dependent variable I identified a year (or in most cases, years) of occurrence, as shown beneath each of the events in Table 3. These dates were then used to define cohorts who would have experienced the event between the ages of 12 and 29; their birth years are shown in the next line of Table 3. 

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7 Some of the events lasted several years (World War II, Glasnost and Perestroika) while others can be pinned more precisely to a single year (the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.). In one case, however – Stalin’s reign, which lasted a quarter of a century – the “event” represents not a
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

For each event, a dummy variable was created to identify respondents who were in the critical years cohorts (coded 1 if the respondent was in the critical years cohorts, 0 if not). Table 3 displays odds ratios, which quantify the effect on mentions of each event of being in a critical years cohort. The first set of odds ratios (labeled “Odds ratios for critical years cohorts vs. all other cohorts”) shows the effects of the critical years cohorts, when contrasted with the effects of all other cohorts combined. In some instances, however, this overall comparison masks the fact that the critical years effects are not significantly different from the effects of all other cohorts—only from the younger or the older cohorts. Therefore, the second and third sets of odds ratios show the effects of critical years cohorts with separate comparisons to older and younger cohorts.

World War II: A Truncated Cohort Effect

As noted earlier, even in 2000, two-thirds of Emigrant respondents considered World War II one of the most important events. Figure 1 shows that predicted probabilities of mentioning the war are high across all birth cohorts, but among the two oldest cohorts, the probability of mentioning the war is between .80 and .90. (In this and other figures, a bold line is used for the part of the curve corresponding approximately to cohorts who were in their critical years at the time of the event.)

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

These probabilities in the emigrant sample, and the percentages of Russian and Ukrainian citizens who mentioned the war in the 1990 national survey (Rieger 1995), are far greater than those found in the United States, where only one-quarter to one-third mentioned World War II (Schuman and Rodgers 2004). This difference is undoubtedly a function of how directly citizens discrete memory but an entire period of Soviet history. For this event, I employed two approaches to dating. In the first approach (labeled “1” in Table 5), I used the dates of Stalin’s long reign, yielding a span of 40 birth years needed to capture all cohorts’ critical years experience of the Stalin era. In the second approach (labeled “2” in Table 5), I restrict the event dates to the “purge years” of 1936-38 that came to symbolize the Stalinist regime. Space exploration presents a somewhat similar problem, in that the category might reasonably include events from the launch of Sputnik in 1958 to the more routine missions of the 1990s. Here, however, I assigned the date of Yury Gagarin’s flight into space; this was the specific memory mentioned by most responses coded into this category, and I assume it was also the one borne in mind by the majority of respondents who were not so specific in their responses.
in the different countries were affected by the war: among the emigrants, mentions of personal experiences of evacuation, loss and suffering during the war are concentrated among the oldest three cohorts. In studies conducted in Germany, Britain and Japan—countries that also experienced the war acutely, despite obvious and important differences—the percentages mentioning World War II are similarly much higher than in the U.S., at 38%, 45%, and 63%, respectively (Schuman, Akiyama and Knäuper 1998; Scott and Zac 1993). In the Soviet Union, the impact of citizens’ personal wartime experience may have been further heightened by the fact that the war made possible a “spontaneous de-Stalinization” (Tumarkin 1995): in a departure from the Stalinist emphasis on ideology and the role of leadership, it once again became possible to recognize the efforts, accomplishments, and heroism of resourceful individuals, and to express genuine emotion in both the cultural and personal realms (Brooks 2000).

World War II is the earliest event for which formal comparisons to both older and younger cohorts can reliably be made. Looking at the odds ratio shown in Table 3 for critical years vs. all other years, those in the critical years cohorts are much more likely to mention the war. However, the further comparisons reveal that this effect is entirely due to the difference between critical years and younger cohorts; in fact, the odds ratio of 0.720 reported in Table 3 indicates that the critical years cohorts are less likely to mention the war than are older cohorts (though the older comparison cohort of 10 respondents is extremely small, and this odds ratio does not approach statistical significance). There are probably too few respondents who were already past their critical years when the war occurred to test this part of the hypothesis adequately; it is also likely that for such an intensively- and universally-experienced event the critical years extend to ages beyond the twenties. In any case, it is clear that the war had a lasting impact on the respondents who experienced it, but is not as prominent in the memory of cohorts who came later (as was also true in countries like Japan, where the war similarly had enormous impact and importance).

The decline in mentions of the war among the 1950-59 cohort and later increase among younger cohorts is not as clear as the earlier peak, but the contrast between the 1950-59 and later cohorts is significant (odds ratio for the 1950-59 cohort vs. the later two = .518, p = .049, n = 272); moreover, data from the 1990 national survey also show a dip in mentions of the war for
this same cohort (Rieger 1995).\textsuperscript{8} Two factors may contribute to this pattern. First, the 1950-59 cohort was the first to have no direct personal experience of the war, even as children. Other research has attested to the importance of direct experience for memories of events distant in time (Schuman, Akiyama and Knäuper 1998); in the case of military conflicts, that relationship may be due to the way in which direct experience engages the self (Conway and Haque 1999).

Second, the World War II cult that developed under Brezhnev, twenty years after the war’s end, produced a narrative that may have further contributed to the war’s continuing importance in the popular imagination. In this portrayal—evoked by the name “Great Patriotic War,” still used frequently by both Soviet citizens in 1990 and emigrants in 2000—the Communist Party led the U.S.S.R. to victory over fascism, saving Europe and the rest of the world (Tumarkin 1995). The increase for cohorts born in 1960 and after may reflect the impact of this war cult.\textsuperscript{9}

In light of the trauma and suffering inflicted upon all those who experienced the war years, as well as later depictions of the war that bolstered and expanded upon purely personal memories, it is hardly surprising to find that memories of the war are not restricted narrowly to the critical years cohorts. In addition, the threefold meaning of the war for these mostly Jewish emigrants may have helped to reinforce their memories. They experienced it as potential targets in their identities first as Russians or Ukrainians, and second as Jews: as Ilya Ehrenburg, a writer who worked as a war correspondent, said in 1941, “I am a Russian writer. But the Nazis have reminded me of something else; my mother’s name was Hannah. I am a Jew” (Brooks 2000, p. 173). And, third, they experienced it as citizens of a victorious nation, either directly at the war’s end, or vicariously, through the myths woven much later.

The Stalin Era and the Death of Stalin: One Truncated and One Clear Effect

Of the events mentioned by substantial numbers of respondents, the Stalin era is the earliest in time. Only limited comparisons can be made for this event, however, since the critical years cohorts encompass all respondents in the sample who were born prior to the event; as was

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\textsuperscript{8} The 1950-59 and later cohorts were compared in terms of age, education, and ethnicity, but no differences emerged that would account for the difference in memories of the war.

\textsuperscript{9} The lasting effects of the narrative are clear from the emigrants’ responses: 27% mentioned the Soviet World War II victory specifically, and while these responses were most likely to come from the cohorts who had experienced the war firsthand, substantial proportions of those born during the 1950’s and 1960’s also mentioned the victory.
the case for World War II, the comparisons are truncated. Even when the event dating is restricted to the purge years of 1936-38, only 2 respondents fall into the “older” cohort category. For memories of the Stalin era, therefore, the critical years cohorts can be compared only to the younger cohorts, but this comparison shows that the critical years cohorts are significantly more likely than the younger cohorts to mention this period of Soviet history.

In contrast, the Death of Stalin exhibits a clear cohort effect. Stalin died in 1953, near the midpoint of the long span of time covered by the major events mentioned by the Emigrants. The odds ratios in Table 3 show a significant effect for the Death of Stalin when the critical years cohorts are contrasted with younger cohorts, and a marginally significant effect when they are contrasted with older cohorts. Figure 2 leaves no doubt about the curvilinearity of the relationship: predicted probabilities of mentioning the Death of Stalin are highest for those born between 1920 and 1949. Detection of a critical years effect in this case is facilitated by the sizable ns for the critical years, older, and younger cohort groups (see Table 3) and probably also by the fact that the event was dramatic, unexpected and limited in time.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

_Space Exploration and Glasnost and Perestroika: Likely Cohort Effects_

Mentions of two other events also exhibit critical years cohort effects, though neither can be fully confirmed through the formal significance tests. Figure 3 shows the curve for predicted probabilities of mentions of Space Exploration; when a quadratic term is included in the model to test for curvilinearity, it is significant (odds ratio = .866, \( p = .013 \)). For the critical years significance tests, the date of 1961—the year in which Yury Gagarin became the first person launched into space—was used to define critical years cohorts. However, as Table 3 shows, only the difference between the odds ratio for the critical years cohorts and that for older cohorts is significant. In contrast to most of the other events, which suffer from a problem of underpopulation in either the younger or the older cohort contrast groups, all ns are sizable in the

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10 Most respondents mentioning an event coded into the space exploration category—55 out of 75 mentions—specifically mentioned Gagarin’s flight. Only 6 respondents mentioned the 1969 moon landing by American astronauts, the most recent of the events coded into this category; the remainder mentioned “space” or “space exploration” in general terms. Neither restricting the category to specific mentions of Gagarin nor eliminating the moon landing responses affects the nature or the significance of the critical years findings. Similarly, there is no effect on the results when a date range (1961-1969), rather than the single year of 1961, is used to define the critical years cohorts.
case of Space Exploration (see Table 3), so this is unlikely to result from small subsample sizes.

Figure 3 shows that there is an upturn in mentions of space exploration among younger cohorts that appears to attenuate the contrast with critical years cohorts.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

It is worth noting that an earlier U.S. study found no critical years effect for space exploration; Schuman and Scott (1989) suggest that, for older people, memories of important political events like World War II are separate from, and thus not overwhelmed by, memories of non-political events. For younger people, they suggest, memories of technological or scientific events may be reinforced by continuing developments in the same domain. By contrast, in the emigrant data, the importance of World War II for older cohorts does appear to overwhelm memories of all other events, including Space Exploration; Schuman and Scott’s explanation for the relatively high levels of memories younger cohorts may apply here, however.

Figure 4 shows graphically the higher levels of mention of Glasnost and Perestroika among cohorts born in 1950 and after, whose critical years coincided with Gorbachev’s reforms. The odds ratios reported in Table 3 confirm that respondents who were between the ages of 12 and 29 during the period from the mid-1980’s to 1991 had significantly greater odds than older cohorts of mentioning Glasnost and Perestroika. With only 28 respondents young enough to have missed experiencing Glasnost and Perestroika during their critical years, the odds ratio for the contrast with younger cohorts is inflated and is not significant, but the effect is in the hypothesized direction.

FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE

While many responses coded into the Glasnost and Perestroika category contained nothing more than the word “perestroika” or simply mentioned reforms under Gorbachev, a substantial number pointed directly to important consequences of perestroika: the end of the communist system and the loss of control over Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics. Responses that contained references to the end of the Communist Party’s monopoly, to the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the breakup of the eastern bloc, to independence movements in the republics, etc., were separated from the other responses in the category; both groups are plotted separately in Figure 5. The relationship to birth cohort of the Consequences of Perestroika responses is striking. Indeed, despite the downturn in overall mentions of Perestroika by the 1970-82 cohort (see Figure 4 and the curve for “Other Content of Perestroika” in Figure 5), that youngest cohort
was the most likely to mention Consequences of Perestroika. Those who were adolescents and very young adults at the time were—more than any other cohort—attuned to the larger meaning of the events.

FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE

Collapse of the Soviet Union: A Negative Finding

One final event differs from the others in that it shows no sign of any cohort effect: the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. that followed declarations of independence by several Soviet republics and the August 1991 attempted coup. The curve shown in Figure 6 is essentially flat, and the odds ratios reported in Table 3 show no significant effect for the critical years cohorts (and in fact the direction of the association is opposite from the hypothesized direction, since those in the critical years cohorts are less likely to mention the event). The comparison is truncated at the younger end, since there are only 12 respondents in the sample who were born after the critical cohort birth years of 1962-1979. Even the oldest among these 12 youngest respondents would have been only 20 in 2000, and so would not even have fully experienced his or her own critical years at the time of the survey. Moreover, in light of the enormous significance of the Collapse of the U.S.S.R., a critical years effect might well extend into younger ages than is normally the case. Thus, one possibility is that no downturn can be detected because there are too few (or no) respondents in cohorts younger than the critical years cohorts.

FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE

Another speculative possibility is that the Collapse may be an event whose impact depends partly on prior experience. One respondent described his memory as follows: “the Collapse of the Soviet Union—the country where I was born, finished school and the institute, and worked for 33 years in one place.” Perhaps cohorts who had lived their entire lives in Soviet society felt the impact of the Collapse as, or even more acutely than those whose critical years coincided with it; the earlier cohorts especially would have experienced the Soviet Union’s many positive achievements, not just the stagnation of the Brezhnev years, and thus may have felt a greater sense of loss. Just 12 responses conveyed a positive or negative attitude in mentions of the Collapse, all from respondents who were born before 1940. In contrast, younger cohorts who

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11 One further possibility is of an interaction between birth cohort and some other variable, such as time of emigration. However, an inspection of crosstabulations yields no evidence of such interaction effects.
had come of age during the Gorbachev years of active questioning and revelations about Soviet society and history may never have taken the Soviet system for granted the way their parents and grandparents had.

If both of these effects are operating simultaneously—truncation at the younger cohort end of the curve, and increased relevance of the event at the older end—the net result would be to suppress the expected downturns, producing a flat curve like that shown in the figure. Even if overall mentions of the Collapse do not show a cohort relation, we would expect respondents’ perceptions of the event to show variation by generation. Unfortunately, attempts to code more specific content of responses in order to test this hypothesis were fruitless; perhaps because the impact of the event defies brief description, most respondents wrote nothing more than “collapse of the U.S.S.R.,” or “disintegration of the country,” so that the level of detail was insufficient to differentiate responses in terms of their content.

One further influence that may complicate the task of detecting a cohort effect is related to the recency of the Collapse. Schuman, Akiyama and Knäuper (1998) hypothesize that certain events with no personal or autobiographical meaning may nonetheless be accessible in memory due to their recency and the wide availability of information about them. Despite the obvious significance of the Collapse for all those living in the U.S.S.R., not to mention its implications, both positive and negative, for Jews specifically, Soviet citizens did not experience it as an event that threatened their own or their families’ survival in the way that World War II did. The content of the memories testifies to this, both in the absence of personal perspectives on or narratives related to the Collapse, and in the fact that no vivid or “flashbulb” memories (highly detailed memories that often preserve features of the circumstances in which important news was learned [Brown and Kulik 1977]) were offered. Such vivid memories did occur in connection with respondents’ memories of World War II.12 The lack of a clear cohort effect for this event may result from the fact that it is recency, not the “earlier deeper encoding that is connected to the self” (Schuman, Akiyama and Knäuper 1998) that is responsible for the mentions of this event.

12 Just 16, or 5%, of the Collapse responses incorporated personal or emotional content, in contrast to the 12% of World War II responses that included such content.
The Relationship of Memories to Emigration Cohort

Might the time of emigration also function as a critical period that, like the years of adolescence and early adulthood, is associated with greater impressionability? Mannheim (1928 [1952]) suggests that emigrants’ contact with the new environment may constitute a fresh encounter much like that of the adolescent embarking on an independent life. Two studies offer empirical evidence that life-changing experiences can produce their own cohort relation to memories. In a study of Bangladeshi participants’ autobiographical memories, Conway and Haque (1999) found that memories were related to experience of significant political events in patterns that diverged from the usual critical years relation. Older participants’ memories plotted over the lifecourse revealed two clusters: one linked to adolescence and the early adulthood years, and the other related to the period of opposition to Pakistani rule and the 1971 struggle for independence, which this older group had experienced during their forties and fifties. Younger participants’ memories displayed only the adolescence and early adulthood “critical years” cluster; they had been too young to experience the political events culminating in independence. Parallel findings come from a small-scale study of Latino immigrants: Schrauf and Rubin (2001) found that their memories clustered around the time of their immigration.

As noted earlier, for many of the emigrants from the former U.S.S.R., emigration was a significant and irreversible event. Whether because of the consequences of applying to emigrate, because of the upheaval and novelty of existence in an unknown country, or because of the adaptation such a transition requires, we might expect to see a pattern of association between memories of events and emigration cohort. Most of the events named by respondents occurred decades before their emigration, but two events—Glasnost and Perestroika, and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R.—intersect with the departure of many emigrants in the sample and can be examined from this perspective.

Figure 7 shows predicted probabilities of mentioning Glasnost and Perestroika and Collapse of the U.S.S.R., by year of emigration. Respondents emigrating prior to 1988 are grouped in a single category, because there were too few to represent individual years, but otherwise, emigration years are shown individually.13

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13 It should be noted that, by using individual years of emigration, a level of precision is required of the data that is not normally expected when using cohorts. In this case, however, it is not feasible to group respondents into broader cohorts, because both the distance in time from events
The predicted probabilities for Glasnost and Perestroika in Figure 7 have the appearance of a mild curvilinear relation to year of emigration. However, neither the test for curvilinearity nor the contrast of emigration cohorts 1988-93 vs. all others is significant. The curve for the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. is quite different: beginning with the 1991 emigration cohort, there is a linear association with mentions of the Collapse (odds ratio = 1.147, \( p = .004 \)). Thus there is no evidence for the hypothesized relation of emigration to memories of these two public events, and no indication that the time of emigration produces a critical years effect on memories of public events.

The linear association between year of emigration and memories of the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. is entirely unexpected, however. One possible interpretation is that, for those who emigrated as the Soviet Union disintegrated and after, the events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union had a direct impact on their decision to emigrate and on their emigration experience. During the late 1980’s, glasnost brought opportunities for renewal of Jewish culture, and official, institutional discrimination against Jews ended (Gitelman 1991). At the same time, however, grassroots anti-Semitism began to gain strength, fanned by newly unfettered nationalism and the rise of ultranationalist parties, and many Jews became worried about the consequences for them of the changes in the U.S.S.R. (Yuval-Davis 1990; Basok 1991; Benifand 1991). In 1988-89, restrictions on emigration were lifted, and Jews were freely allowed to leave (Simon 1997). Being Jewish suddenly became desirable (Basok 1991), since Jews could gain entry to the U.S. and other countries as refugees or persecuted minorities (Beyer 1991).

On the other hand, changes to U.S. refugee policy instituted in the late 1980’s began to signal future restrictions (Beyer 1991). Particularly in the climate of economic and political instability of the early 1990’s, many Jews must have wondered how long their newly-gained freedoms—including the freedom to emigrate—would endure. The fact that the peak emigration years of 1991 and 1992 (Ryvkina 1997) coincided with the Soviet collapse suggests that many and the time span covered by years of emigration (about 10 years, since most of the emigrants departed in 1988 or after) are so short.

14 In the test for curvilinearity, the odds ratio for the quadratic term is 0.983, \( p = .095 \); for the contrast of 1988-93 emigration cohorts vs. all others, the odds ratio is 1.351, \( p = .065 \).

15 Possible interactions of other variables with year of emigration were examined, but no significant effects were found.
Jews decided to leave while they had the opportunity. Those who waited until later in the 1990’s may have been even more anxious that the window of opportunity would close. For all of these reasons, emigrants who departed in 1991 or after may have perceived a very concrete link between their emigration and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R., making the event more memorable.

It is difficult to test this explanation, but one indication of a direct connection in respondents’ minds between the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and emigration might lie in the reasons respondents gave for deciding to emigrate. When the reasons given by those who emigrated before 1991 are compared to those given by emigrants departing between 1991-97, however, there is no indication that either concerns about anti-Semitism or actual experiences of discrimination were greater among the latter group. They are more likely to mention social and economic instability as a reason for deciding to emigrate ($\chi^2 = 7.233, p = .007, df = 1$), but this seems primarily a reflection of changed conditions within the former Soviet Union. Moreover, none of these reasons for emigrating are significantly related to memories of the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. in the regressions. Thus, there is little evidence that recent emigrants’ memories of the Collapse were motivated by a specific connection between the political events and their decision to emigrate.

An alternative possibility centers on length of residence in the U.S., which is, of course, confounded with emigration year. There is evidence from studies of Soviet emigrants that longer residence in the U.S. is associated with decreasing attachment to Russian culture (Birman and Trickett 2001). Just as Russian identity declines over time, memories of events in the U.S.S.R. may not be as salient for those who have been in the U.S. for a longer period.\(^\text{16}\) This explanation is appealing because it makes sense of the fairly monotonic increase in the trend beginning in 1991. It does, however, raise the question of why such a relationship should occur for the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. and not for Glasnost and Perestroika.

Speculatively, the difference between these two patterns may be related to both the nature and the symbolic content of events. \textit{Glasnost} and \textit{perestroika}, while of critical importance

\(^{16}\) Birman and Trickett (2001) found that, while attachment to Russian culture decreased over time for adults, the increase in attachment to American culture was only slight. In this regard, it is interesting that only 22 respondents in the emigrant sample mentioned any public event that occurred in or involved the U.S. Mention of a U.S. event was unrelated to length of residence in the U.S., but it was significantly correlated with a more direct indicator of acculturation, self-rated English-language ability ($r = .086, p = .007$).
politically, were changes that extended over a longer period, not “events” in the sense of an occurrence limited in time. Moreover, the full significance of glasnost and perestroika could only be understood in retrospect, after those changes had culminated in the abortive coup attempt and the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1991. Thus, it is the final Collapse that symbolizes most efficiently and powerfully the empire’s former prestige and the “loss of a Soviet master narrative” (Boym 1994). As the final episode of the Soviet era, it was surely the most salient and accessible memory that captured both the rise and decline of the U.S.S.R.—particularly significant for recent emigrants, but conceivably of declining significance as greater time in the U.S. reduced attachment to Russian/Soviet culture.

The one other event to show the same relationship to emigration cohort is also a symbol of Soviet power, but of its keynote success rather than its demise: Space Exploration. Evidence that the Soviet space record has symbolic importance for residents of Russia comes from a 2002 national survey conducted by the Russian polling organization Fond obshchestvennoe mnenie (FOM). Respondents were asked what, if anything, they were proud of in Soviet history: aerospace achievements, named by 14% of respondents, were the second most frequently mentioned, following only the victory in World War II (FOM 2002).

Figure 8 plots the emigrants’ predicted probabilities of mentioning Space Exploration by emigration year; the overall linear trend is significant (odds ratio = 1.108, \( p = .027 \)), although the curve does not show a clear monotonic association with emigration year. It is interesting that probabilities of mention increase greatly beginning with the 1991 emigration year; the U.S.S.R.’s loss of great power status may have motivated those emigrating to identify positive memories of past Soviet achievements of the country they were leaving. Other events that also have symbolic value—World War II and perhaps also the Death of Stalin—do not show any relation to emigration year. Despite their importance, they are more mixed in meaning, representing both suffering and liberation, and do not encapsulate as neatly the high and low points of Soviet power. Memories of Space Exploration and the Collapse of the U.S.S.R. may be especially significant to recent emigrants who, compared to those who have been in the U.S. longer, are more engaged in defining their relationship not only to their country of destination, but also to the country they only recently left.

FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
Conclusions

For five of the six major public events mentioned by the emigrants, a characteristic curvilinear relation to birth cohort can be discerned, indicating that memories formed in youth remain important despite later transformative experiences. Tests of the hypothesis that emigration cohort should be related to memories of events that coincided with the years of emigration yielded negative results, again underscoring the enduring nature of memories from the critical years and the difficulty of replacing those memories with later ones. Thus, it is clear that the memories of this group of emigrants relate not to their adopted home, but to a shared Soviet past. The findings reported here show no evidence of the process Park and Burgess (1921) had envisioned, whereby memories of the new country replace those of the old; rather, they testify to the durability of memories across space and over time. The memories of these emigrants, formed mostly during their youth, are overwhelmingly of a country consigned, both by history and by emigration, to the past.

This research has relevance that extends beyond the experience of emigrants from the former U.S.S.R. to the study of immigrants more generally. Much immigration research focuses squarely on experience in the country of destination, with relatively little attention to experience in the country of origin, except to the extent that such experience is captured by contrasts between ethnic groups. The findings presented here underscore the potential importance of considering experience in the country of origin in order to understand acculturation and assimilation processes. Moreover, recent work on immigration suggests that the ongoing influx of immigrants from particular regions or countries creates a condition of “perpetual immigration” that makes the older concept of immigrant generations less meaningful, particularly as a basis for understanding assimilation processes (Massey 1995). In situations where immigrant groups are constantly replenished, even the second and third generations have direct access to recent immigrants and to ethnic resources, facilitating maintenance of ethnic identity (Waters and

Indeed, there is little evidence of a shift in focus to events occurring in the United States or elsewhere, although of course the time period under study was distinguished by events of great significance taking place in the former U.S.S.R., with no events in the U.S. that could be considered of comparable importance. This lack of competing U.S. events was reflected in a national cross-section sample of Americans interviewed in 2000: the 1991 Gulf War was the only directly U.S.-related event those respondents named from the period 1985-2000, and even that was mentioned by only about 5% (Schuman and Rodgers 2004).
As immigrants are replenished, the value of generation as a fundamental analytical concept for understanding assimilation may be reduced, since successive generations are not necessarily increasingly isolated from recent immigrants (Massey 1995). Memories may be one such resource contributing to ethnic identity and/or helping to frame perceptions of the new country. Greater contact between successive immigrant generations and recent immigrants might extend the length of time over which memories are rehearsed and preserved, as well as increase the possibility that the past will be represented differently by various sub-groups for specific purposes. In short, the importance of memories for immigrants, both at the individual and the cultural level, seems likely to increase with immigrant replenishment.

A situation of perpetual immigration increases the possibility that immigrants from the same country or region may be viewed as an undifferentiated stream with regard to their experience prior to arrival. My research on emigrants from the former U.S.S.R. suggests that such an assumption would be misguided: there is ample evidence from this study that emigrants’ exposure to particular public events during the period of late adolescence and early adulthood produces memories that persist after emigration. The concept of “political generation” is thus as relevant to immigrants as it is to non-immigrants, but must take into account “critical years” experience in the country of origin. This point is applicable to immigrants from any part of the world, of course, but perhaps bears particular consideration in the context of first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants, many of whom have been exposed to a post-colonial legacy of violent conflict as well as to hostility of and marginalization by host societies. Research on collective memories may be able to contribute to an understanding of the social sources of immigrant anger, as manifested in recent acts of violence and terrorism in Europe.
References


